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ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things (IoT) will be a main data generation infras-
tructure for achieving better system intelligence. However, the ex-
tensive data collection and processing in IoT also engender various
privacy concerns. This paper provides a taxonomy of the exist-
ing privacy-preserving machine learning approaches developed
in the context of cloud computing and discusses the challenges
of applying them in the context of IoT. Moreover, we present a
privacy-preserving inference approach that runs a lightweight neu-
ral network at IoT objects to obfuscate the data before transmission
and a deep neural network in the cloud to classify the obfuscated
data. Evaluation based on the MNIST dataset shows satisfactory
performance.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Domain-specific security and pri-
vacy architectures; •Computer systems organization→ Sen-
sor networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the advances of sensing and communication technologies,
the Internet of Things (IoT) will become a main data generation
infrastructure in the future. The drastically increasing amount of
data generated by IoT will create unprecedented opportunities for
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various novel applications powered bymachine learning (ML). How-
ever, various system challenges need to be addressed to implement
the envisaged intelligent IoT.
IoT in nature is a distributed system consisting of heterogeneous
nodes with distinct sensing, computation, and communication capa-
bilities. Specifically, it consists of massive mote-class sensors deeply
embedded in the physical world, personal devices that move with
people, widespread network edge devices such as wireless access
points, as well as the cloud backend. Implementing the fabric of IoT
and ML faces the following two key challenges:
• Separation of data sources andMLcomputationpower:Most
IoT data will be generated by the end devices that often have
limited computation resources, while the computation power
needed by ML model training and execution will be located at
the edge devices and in the cloud. Besides, the communication
channels between the end devices and the edge/cloud are often
constrained, in that they are limited in bandwidth, intermittent,
and of long delays.
• Privacy preservation: As the end devices can be deeply embed-
ded in people’s private space and time, the data generated by
them will contain privacy-sensitive information. To gain wide
acceptance, the IoT-ML fabric must respect the human users’
privacy. The lack of privacy preservation may even go against
the recent legislation such as the General Data Protection Regu-
lation in European Union. However, privacy preservation often
presents substantial challenges to the system design.
Privacy-preserving ML has received extensive research in the
context of cloud computing. Thus, it is of great interest to investi-
gate whether the existing solutions can be applied in the context
of IoT. To this end, this paper provides a taxonomy of the exist-
ing privacy-preserving ML approaches, which are classified into
two categories: privacy-preserving training and privacy-preserving
inference. The former, which has received considerable research
attention, is comprised of parameter transmission-based and data
transmission-based approaches. Each of them can be further di-
vided into multiple sub-categories. In contrast, our literature survey
shows that less research work concentrates on privacy-preserving
inference. Since the computation and communication overheads
are the key considerations in the design of IoT systems, we tenta-
tively label the existing privacy-preserving ML approaches with
high-overhead, medium-overhead, and low-overhead regarding com-
putation complexity and iterative communication, data swelling, and
data retention/compression regarding communication overhead. ML
for IoT should be of low-overhead and data retention/compression.
From our survey, a number of privacy-preserving training ap-
proaches with various privacy protection objectives [10, 14, 21, 22,
26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 39, 41, 45] can be labeled low-overhead and data
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Figure 1: The hierachical taxonomy of privacy-preserving machine learning approaches.
retention/compression. In contrast, the existing privacy-preserving
inference approaches have high computation or communication
overheads. Thus, we think that privacy-preserving inference for IoT
should receive more research attention, since many IoT applications
leverage pre-trained ML models for inference instead of training
models from scratch. Thus, in the second part of this paper, we
present a lightweight and voluntary privacy-preserving inference
approach that is suitable for resource-constrained IoT objects. The
approach is as follows. Given a well trained deep model that will be
executed by the edge/cloud for inference, the approach trains a few
dense layers such that the concatenation of these layers and the
given deep model still yields satisfactory inference accuracy. At run
time, an IoT end device executes these dense layers to obfuscate
the inference data sample and sends the result to the edge/cloud
for inference. Our approach is voluntary in that the deep model at
the edge/cloud admits both original and obfuscated data samples.
Each IoT end device in the system can choose to execute the dense
layers for obfuscation or simply send the original data for inference.
This design accommodates the end devices that cannot perform the
obfuscation due to say limited computing capability. The evaluation
based on the MNIST dataset [27] of handwritten digits shows that
our obfuscation approach well protects the confidentiality of the
raw form of the data samples and maintains the inference accuracy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. §2 presents
the taxonomy of the existing privacy-preserving ML approaches
and their limitations in the context of IoT. §3 presents our light-
weight and voluntary privacy-preserving inference approach and
evaluation result. §4 concludes this paper and discusses future work.
2 EXISTING APPROACHES & LIMITATIONS
Fig. 1 illustrates the taxonomy of the existing privacy-preserving
ML schemes. The nodes in a privacy-preserving ML system often
have two roles: participant and coordinator. The participants are
often the data generators (e.g., smartphones), whereas the coordi-
nator (e.g., a cloud server) orchestrates the ML process. Since ML
has two phases, i.e., training and inference, we classify the existing
approaches into two groups at the top level. The privacy-preserving
training schemes (§2.1) aim to learn a global ML model or multiple
local ML models from disjoint local datasets which, if aggregated,
would provide more useful/precise knowledge. Thus, the primary
objective of privacy protection is to preserve the privacy of the data
used for building an ML model in the training phase. Differently,
privacy-preserving inference schemes (§2.2) focus on the scenario
where a global ML model at the coordinator has been trained and
the participants transmit the unlabeled data to the coordinator for
inference. The aim is to protect the privacy of the input data in the
inference phase and maintain the inference accuracy.
Privacy-preserving training schemes can be further classified
based on whether the privacy-sensitive training data samples are
transmitted or only the model parameters are transmitted for model
training. Parameter transmission-based approaches (§2.1.1) include
distributed machine learning and model personalization. The ap-
proaches that need to transmit local data samples (§2.1.2) can be
classified into anonymization, cryptographic methods, obfuscation,
and data synthesis according to the processing made on the training
data. (1) Anonymization approaches de-identify data records but
do not change the data of interest for model training. (2) Crypto-
graphic methods apply cryptographic primitives to encrypt the
data transmitted. (3) Obfuscation methods transform the training
data vectors through additive perturbation, multiplicative pertur-
bation, and generative obfuscation. (4) Data synthesis generates
a new dataset that resembles the original dataset. Note that some
of the data transmission-based approaches for privacy-preserving
training are data publishing techniques, which focus on the proper
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sharing of the data or query results and in general do not explicitly
address the problem of ML model training. Our taxonomy includes
them for the completeness of the related work review.
Most existing privacy-preserving ML approaches were designed
in the context of cloud computing. The participants are often resource-
rich nodes from smartphones to cloud servers. In particular, the
overhead of communications is not a key concern due to the avail-
ability of high-speed connections (e.g., wireline networks and 4G
cellular networks). Differently, in the context of IoT, the participants
are often resource-constrained devices. Moreover, the communi-
cation links among them are generally constrained. Therefore, in
the review of the privacy-preserving training (§2.1) and inference
(§2.2) approaches, we will qualitatively discuss their computation
overhead and communication overhead. Here are our qualitative
labels of the computation and communication overheads:
• Computation overhead: We classify the level of computation over-
head into high, medium, and low, with homomorphic encryption,
neural network training/inference, and additive/multiplicative
noisification as the representative examples, respectively. The
high-overhead computation tasks are in general infeasible for
IoT end devices. For the medium-overhead computation, IoT end
devices are increasingly capable of neural network inference com-
putation due to the emerging inference chips such as Google’s
Edge TPU [19]. However, neural network training is still largely
infeasible for IoT end devices at present.
• Communication overhead: We classify the communication over-
heads of the existing approaches into three categories: iterative
communication, data swelling, data retention/compression, with
distributed machine learning, homomorphic encryption, and ad-
ditive/multiplicative perturbation as the representative examples,
respectively. Specifically, distributed machine learning requires
iterative model parameter exchanges among the training par-
ticipants. Such iterative communications will cause significant
challenges for IoT networks due to the bandwidth-limited and
intermittent communication links. The ciphertexts produced by
homomorphic encryption algorithms often have higher data vol-
umes than the plaintexts. In contrast, the additive and multiplica-
tive perturbation will retain and even reduce the data volumes.
Storage overhead is also a factor of concern for IoT end devices.
However, this paper primarily focuses on computation and com-
munication overhead due to the page limit.
2.1 Privacy-Preserving Training
The latest privacy-preserving training approaches that leverage
distributed privacy-sensitive data to construct a global ML model or
multiple localMLmodels can be divided into parameter transmission-
based (§2.1.1) and data transmission-based (§2.1.2) techniques.
2.1.1 Parameter Transmission-Based Approaches. Approaches of
this category transmit model parameters instead of data samples
for model training. In this way, parameter transmission-based ap-
proaches to privacy-preserving training push computation towards
participants rather than the coordinator.
Distributed Machine Learning. Distributed Machine Learning
(DML) is a representative approach of this category. In DML [7, 8,
11, 23, 32, 42, 50], data owners do not reveal their own datasets to
anyone in the training phase. In each iteration, the participants
upload merely the locally computed parameters or gradients to the
coordinator to achieve collaborative learning [43]. Conventional
DML algorithms [7, 23, 42, 50] exploit the fact that the optimization
algorithms based on stochastic gradient descent (SGD) can be paral-
lelized, if the data held by different participants are independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Variants of SGD such as Selec-
tive SGD [42], parallel SGD [50], Alternating Direction Method of
Multipliers SGD [7] and Downpour SGD [11] are normally used to
update the model weights in the distributed fashion.
Federated learning [8, 32] is another prevailing DML approach
with more generalized assumptions. In each iteration, a fraction of
participants are randomly selected to retrain the model with their
local data using the current global model as the starting point and
then individually upload the local stochastic gradient descents. The
coordinator will then average the gradient descents and update the
global model. However, while federated learning [8, 32] manages to
reduce communication overhead, it increases the local computation
overhead.
Arguably, model parameters contain some information about
the local training data. Therefore, in [8, 23, 42], differential privacy
[13] is achieved by adding noises to the locally computed param-
eter updates. Such schemes thwart definitive inferences about an
individual participant if an adversary intentionally collects the ob-
fuscated model updates. Besides, secure data aggregation is applied
to aggregate the updates from individual participants [6]. Phong
et al. [37] also use additively homomorphic encryption [12] to en-
crypt model parameters in the federated learning scheme to prevent
information leakage.
Limitations: First, training a deep model locally may be imprac-
tical for resource-constrained IoT devices. Second, many iterations
are required for the learning process to converge [26], which results
in substantial communication overhead. Due to the computation
and communication overhead incurred, DML is mainly deployed in
the context of cloud computing with enterprise settings. As shown
in [3, 5], federated learning is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Hitaj
et al. [24] devise a powerful attack based on generative adversarial
networks [18] for local data recovery. The attack is still effective
even when the communicated parameters are perturbed for differ-
ential privacy and secure multi-party computation (MPC) [17] is
applied.
Model Personalization. The aim of model personalization [40] is
not to learn a global model from privacy-sensitive data owned by the
participants, but to learn a personalmodel for each participant based
on a public model trained with public data as the starting point.
Specifically, the public model is firstly trained with a set of public
data at the coordinator and then distributed to each participant.
Then, each participant retrains the model with local data. The idea
of transfer leaning [35] is leveraged to achieve better performance
than the model training with merely local data.
Limitations: This approach may be ineffective for some tasks
where the local classes have significantly different patterns from
the public data. Additionally, the local training is unsuitable for
resource-constrained IoT devices.
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2.1.2 Data Transmission-Based Approaches. This category of ap-
proaches allows participants to send local data samples to the
honest-but-curious coordinator, while protects certain aspect or at-
tribute of the data samples, e.g., user identity, data contents, or raw
form of data. It has the following sub-categories: anonymization,
cryptographic methods, data obfuscation, and data synthesis.
Anonymization. Anonymization techniques are designed to anonymize
the participant’s identity in a group of users, changing the value
of quasi-identifiers and removing explicit identifiers. Since the aim
is to remove the association between data entries and the data
owner, the data samples of interest used for model training remains
unchanged. For field-structured data, anonymization techniques
include k-anonymity [45], l-diversity [31], and t-closeness [28]. The
k-same family of algorithms [21, 22, 34] are designed to de-identify
face images.
Limitations: As analyzed in [31], anonymization techniques
are vulnerable to homogeneity attack and background knowledge
attack. Furthermore, anonymization techniques are traditional data
publishing techniques proposed for a centralized database. As com-
mented in a survey [46], these anonymization techniques in crowd-
sensing applications have a main drawback of the need for a trusted
proxy to produce the anonymized values and send them to each
participant. This implies the risk of single point of failure.
CryptographicMethods. Cryptographicmethods encrypt the train-
ing data before transmission. However, traditional cryptographic
methods suffer from high computation complexity and the sophisti-
cation of key management [15]. The method of Homomorphic En-
cryption (HE) [12] does not need key propagation and has attracted
research interest. With HE, computation on ciphertexts generates
an encrypted result which matches the result of the operations per-
formed on the plaintext data after decryption. In [20, 38, 47], the ML
model is trained at the coordinator on the HE ciphertexts. During
the inference phase, the data is also encrypted before transmission.
Limitations: However, in HE, operations on the ciphertexts are
required to be expressed as polynomials of a bounded degree. Thus,
HE is normally applied to the operations with a linear discrimi-
nation nature. Furthermore, HE involves intensive computation
and leads to data swelling. As benchmarked in [26], HE causes
computation overhead millions times higher than a multiplicative
obfuscation approach that will be discussed shortly. Additionally,
HE will make the training process at least an order of magnitude
slower [16].
Data Obfuscation. Data obfuscation methods perturb the data
samples used for training a global model. These methods include
additive perturbation, multiplicative perturbation, and generative
obfuscation.
• Additive Perturbation: Normally, additive obfuscation is often
associated with Differential Privacy (DP) [13]. DP is a formal
and quantifiable measure of privacy protection, which can be
incorporated in data mining and data publishing [49]. The key
idea of differentially private data mining [1, 9, 44] is to learn a
model with plaintxt data but perturb the value computed in a
certain step (e.g., gradients in optimization) with noises during the
training. Such techniques, as discussed earlier, are often used in
DML (§2.1.1). Differentially private data publishing aims to output
aggregate information without revealing any specific entry. It can
be achieved by adding noises to the query results using Laplacian
[14], exponential [33], and median [39] mechanisms.
Limitations: Differentially private data publishing techniques
are often used to support the release of limited data representa-
tions, such as contingency tables or histograms [49]. The amount
of noise increases dramatically when the queries are correlated
[49]. Besides, differentially private data publishing often caters
into the setting of centralized systems, where a curator collects
all the data and respond to queries. But such a trusted curator can
be questionable and costly in the context of IoT. Moreover, it in-
curs the risk of single-point failure. If the curator is not available,
each data contributor perturbs its own result, which leads to an
aggregated noise that significantly exceeds the required amount
to ensure ϵ-DP of the final result. The experiment in [26] shows
that, when each participant independently perturbs the training
data vectors with Laplacian noise to achieve ϵ-DP, the support
vector macine and deep neural networks learned from the data
yield poor accuracy.
• Multiplicative Perturbation: Random projection [10, 26, 29, 41]
is a typical multiplicative perturbation. Some random projection
schemes [10] preserve the dimensionality of the data but are sus-
ceptible to approximate reconstruction attack [30]. Other schemes
[26, 29, 41] reduce the dimensions of the data to better preserve
privacy. The approach in [41] standardizes the projection ma-
trix R for all participants. However, this design may scale poorly
since any collusion between participants would breach data pri-
vacy. In [26, 29], participants use different private matrices for
random projection. Therefore, the Euclidean distances for the
perturbed data are no longer preserved, which can significantly
degrade the classification accuracy for distance-based classifiers.
To tackle this problem, in [29], the coordinator uses regression
to reconstruct the pairwise distances between the original data
vectors based on each participant’s obfuscated projection results
of a set of public data samples. However, the coordinator can
use the public samples and their projections to recover random
projection matrix of each participant. In [26], rather than using
regression for distance estimation, deep neural networks (DNNs)
are leveraged to learn the sophisticated pattern of the projected
data from multiple participants.
Limitations: In summary, there exists a trade-off between pri-
vacy and utility when applying multiplicative perturbation. If
each participant uses a different random projection matrix, pri-
vacy can be better preserved but classification accuracy in the
cloud is likely degraded.
• Generative Obfuscation: Different from additive/multiplicative
perturbation techniques, generative models can also produce ob-
fuscated data. Huang et al. [25] propose a Generative Adversarial
Privacy (GAP) algorithm, which is composed of a privatizer and
an adversary network. GAP formulates a minimax game-theoretic
problemwhere the privatizer aims to obfuscate the original dataX
to render a specified privacy-sensitive attribute Y non-classifiable
by the adversary network. The privatizer and adversary are trained
in an iterative manner.
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Limitations: Running a generative model locally for obfuscation
incurs high computation overhead. As a data publishing tech-
nique, although GAP [25] restricts the l2 distance between the
original data vector and the obfuscated data vector to control
the distortion level, there is no guarantee of the utility of the
obfuscated data.
Data Synthesis. Data synthesis methods use generative models
that capture the underlying distribution of a private dataset and gen-
erate resembling data samples. Such generalization, ideally, would
protect individual-specific information. In [2], differentially private
k-means clustering is applied on the raw dataset. Then, generative
models are trained only on their own cluster using differentially
private gradient descent [2].
Limitations: Data synthesis is a data publishing technique and
is usually implemented in a centralized database with massive
data samples. As generative models often incur high computation
overhead, this approach is not suitable for resource-limited IoT
devices.
2.2 Privacy-Preserving Inference
Compared with a body of research on privacy-preserving training,
less work is dedicated to privacy-preserving inference. Privacy-
preserving inference approaches assume that the ML model at the
coordinator has been previously trained using public plaintext data.
They aim to protect the privacy contained in test data vectors while
maintaining the inference accuracy. Additive perturbation is gener-
ally not advisable for deep models because the inference accuracy
of deep models can be significantly degraded by small perturba-
tions on input data [48]. In order to achieve privacy preservation in
the inference phase against an honest-but-curious coordinator run-
ning the ML model, CryptoNets [16] and Multi-party Computation
(MPC) [4] are proposed.
2.2.1 CryptoNets. Gilad-Bachrach et al. [16] adjust the feed-forward
neural network trained with plaintext data so that it can be applied
to the homomorphically encrypted data to make encrypted infer-
ence. A secret key is needed to decrypt the result. Through the
process, not only the data but also the inference result are kept
secret against the honest-but-curious coordinator.
Limitations: Unfortunately, the high computational complexity
of HE renders CryptoNets unpractical for IoT devices. Moreover,
although CryptoNets does not need to support training over cipher-
text, the neural network still needs to satisfy certain conditions. For
example, a square polynomial function instead of a sigmoid or ReLU
function should be used as the activation function. However, using
square polynomial function as the activation function is rare for
existing neural networks. Scaling is also required since encryption
scheme does not support floating-point numbers.
2.2.2 Multi-Party Computation (MPC). MPC [17] enables the par-
ties involved to jointly compute a function over their inputs while
keeping those inputs private. Barni et al. [4] apply MPC in privacy-
preserving inference. Specifically, the participant encrypts the data
and sends it to the coordinator. The coordinator computes an inner
product between the data and the weights of the first layer and
sends the results back to the participant. Then, the participant ap-
plies decryption and non-linear transformation. Results are again
encrypted before being transmitted to the coordinator. The process
continues until all the layers have been computed. In this scheme,
the input data and the knowledge embedded in the neural networks
are both protected.
Limitations: MPC requires many rounds of communication
between the participant and the coordinator, representing consid-
erable communication overhead.
2.3 Remark
The existing approaches reviewed in §2.1 and §2.2 have differ-
ent threat, privacy and system models. The anonymization and
additive/multiplicative perturbation approaches often introduce
affordable overheads and thus are feasible in the context of IoT.
However, anonymization mainly focuses on private data publish-
ing and does not address the problem of model training. Thus,
additive and multiplicative perturbation approaches are promis-
ing for privacy-preserving training in IoT. In contrast, lightweight
privacy-preserving inference approaches for IoT are lacking. Thus,
we believe that privacy-preserving inference deserves more re-
search attention. As such, §3 describes a lightweight and voluntary
privacy-preserving inference approach called ObfNet and the pre-
liminary results.
3 OBFNET: LIGHTWEIGHT & VOLUNTARY
PRIVACY-PRESERVING INFERENCE
3.1 System, Threat, and Privacy Models
Systemmodel:The system consists ofmultiple resource-constrained
participants and a resource-rich coordinator. The coordinator hosts
a pre-trained deep model. The participants collect data samples
and transmit them to the coordinator for inference using the deep
model. The participants do not execute the deep model for infer-
ence due to the following reasons. First, each participant has limited
computation and storage resources for executing the deep model.
Second, in certain scenarios, the deep model may be commercially
confidential and should not be released to the participants.
Threat model: The threat is an honest-but-curious coordinator.
Specifically, the coordinator will not tamper with any data sub-
mitted by the participants and the inference results. However, the
coordinator is curious about the private information contained in
the data submitted by the participants.
Privacy model: The raw form of the submitted data is the par-
ticipant’s privacy to be protected. Data form confidentiality is an
immediate and basic privacy requirement in many applications.
We discuss several related issues. First, although the inference
result may also contain information about the participant, this
paper does not consider label privacy. In practice, to mitigate the
concern of label privacy leak, the participants can send the inference
data samples to the coordinator via anonymity networks, such
that the coordinator cannot associate the inference labels with the
actual identities of the participants. Second, we aim to design a
lightweight and voluntary approach to address the defined privacy
threat. It is lightweight in that the computation performed by a
participant should be affordable to resource-constrained IoT objects.
It is voluntary in that any participant can choose to protect the
data privacy by executing ObfNet for obfuscation or just send the
original data, without needing to inform the coordinator. In other
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Figure 2: System model and approach overview.
(a) The original inference data samples.
(b) The data samples obfuscated with ObfNet1.
(c) The data samples obfuscated with ObfNet2-0.
Figure 3: Inference data samples from MNIST.
words, the pre-trained deep model at the coordinator admits both
original and obfuscated data samples. This is a desirable feature for
legacy deep models.
3.2 Construction of ObfNet
Fig. 2 illustrates our proposed ObfNet approach. The key idea is
that we train a small-scale neural network called ObfNet that gives
an output with the same size as the input. The training of ObfNet
is as follows. After the pre-training of the deep inference model,
we use the same training dataset to train the concatenation of the
ObfNet and the pre-trained deep inference model. During the train-
ing phase of the concatenated model, only the parameters of the
ObfNet are updated while the parameters of the pre-trained infer-
ence model are fixed. As discussed in §2, IoT end devices are in
general incapable of ML model training. So, in our approach, the
ObfNet is trained by the coordinator and released to the partici-
pants for use. The ObfNet uses many-to-one mapping activation
functions, such as the rectified linear unit (ReLU). In that case, the
coordinator cannot estimate the exact original data samples based
on the obfuscated ones since there exist infinite possible inputs
mapping to the same output. For better privacy protection, the co-
ordinator may train multiple ObfNets and send all of them to each
participant. The participants can randomly choose one to obfuscate
the local data. Moreover, depending on the privacy-sensitivity of
the data samples, participants can choose to obfuscate none or part
of the data samples. The more ObfNets the coordinator trains and
distributes, the less likely the coordinator can figure out which
ObfNet is used. However, there exists a trade-off since training and
distributing more ObfNets incur more communication overhead.
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3.3 Evaluation Results with MNIST Dataset
We evaluate our approach with the MNIST dataset [27]. The deep
inference model is LeNet [27], with an inference accuracy of 98.98%.
We train 11 different ObfNets denoted by ObfNet1 and ObfNet2-x ,
where x is from 0 to 9. ObfNet1 consists of one input layer of 784
neurons fully connected to an output layer of 784 neurons with
ReLU as the activation function. It has 615,440 learnable parameters
with a total volume of 2.17 MB. To show how the obfuscation results
change with more hidden layers, we add one more hidden layer of
1,000 neurons in ObfNet2. ObfNet2-x , where x is from 0 to 9, are
of the same structure and trained individually. Each has 1,569,784
learnable parameters and the total volume of each net is 6.01 MB.
The LeNet and ObfNets are implemented using PyTorch [36].
Fig. 3 shows the original MNIST data samples and the obfuscated
samples by ObfNet1 and ObfNet2-0. We can see that the obfuscated
samples by ObfNet1 still contain some traces of the handwritten
digits. However, these traces are not easily recognizable by human
inspection. With one more hidden layer, the obfuscated samples by
ObfNet2-0 are completely unrecognizable. Fig. 4 shows the infer-
ence accuracy of LeNet when each ObfNet2 is applied to obfuscate
the data. As shown in the figure, the difference in the inference
accuracy between each ObfNet2 is negligible and the average in-
ference accuracy of the 10 ObfNets is 98.29%. Compared with the
inference accuracy of LeNet on the original data, the accuracy drop
is only 0.7%. Thus, the obfuscation maintains the inference accuracy
well.
4 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper reviews the existing privacy-preserving ML approaches
that were developed largely in the context of cloud computing and
discusses their limitations in the context of IoT. From our survey,
there is a body of research on privacy-preserving training. Addi-
tive and multiplicative perturbation approaches are promising for
privacy-preserving training in IoT due to their low computation
and communication overhead. In contrast, lightweight privacy-
preserving inference received limited research. Note that many IoT
applications may prefer to use pre-trained deep models. Thus, how
to protect the participants’ data privacy in using the pre-trained
deep models at the coordinator is a meaningful and interesting
topic. To this end, we present ObfNet, a lightweight and voluntary
privacy-preserving inference approach that obfuscates the data
samples while maintaining the inference accuracy of an existing
deep neural network. In our future work, we will perform more ex-
tensive evaluation of ObfNet including its performance with other
datasets and overhead on actual IoT hardware platforms.
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